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Chapter XIX.
Chapter XIX.
That a Prince Should Seek To Escape Contempt and Hatred
Having now spoken of the chief of the qualities above referred to, the
rest I shall dispose of briefly with these general remarks, that a Prince, as
has already in part been said, should consider how he may avoid such courses
as would make him hated or despised; and that whenever he succeeds in keeping
clear of these, he has performed his part, and runs no risk though he incur
other infamies.
A Prince, as I have said before, sooner becomes hated by being rapacious
and by interfering with the property and with the women of his subjects, than
in any other way. From these, therefore, he should abstain. For so long as
neither their property nor their honour is touched, the mass of mankind live
contentedly, and the Prince has only to cope with the ambition of a few, which
can in many ways and easily be kept within bounds.
A Prince is despised when he is seen to be fickle, frivolous, effeminate,
pusillanimous, or irresolute, against which defects he ought therefore most
carefully to guard, striving so to bear himself that greatness, courage,
wisdom, and strength may appear in all his actions. In his private dealings
with his subjects his decisions should be irrevocable, and his reputation such
that no one would dream of overreaching or cajoling him.
The Prince who inspires such an opinion of himself is greatly esteemed,
and against one who is greatly esteemed conspiracy is difficult; nor, when he
is known to be an excellent Prince and held in reverence by his subjects,
will it be easy to attack him. For a Prince is exposed to two dangers, from
within in respect of his subjects, from without in respect of foreign powers.
Against the latter he will defend himself with good arms and good allies, and
if he have good arms he will always have good allies; and when things are
settled abroad, they will always be settled at home, unless disturbed by
conspiracies; and even should there be hostility from without, if he has taken
those measures, and has lived in the way I have recommended, and if he never
abandons hope, he will withstand every attack; as I have said was done by
Nabis the Spartan.
As regards his own subjects, when affairs are quiet abroad, he has to
fear they may engage in secret plots; against which a Prince best secures
himself when he escapes being hated or despised, and keeps on good terms with
his people; and this, as I have already shown at length, it is essential he
should do. Not to be hated or despised by the body of his subjects, is one of
the surest safeguards that a Prince can have against conspiracy. For he who
conspires always reckons on pleasing the people by putting the Prince to
death; but when he sees that instead of pleasing he will offend them, he
cannot summon courage to carry out his design. For the difficulties that
attend conspirators are infinite, and we know from experience that while there
have been many conspiracies, few of them have succeeded.
He who conspires cannot do so alone, nor can he assume as his companions
any save those whom he believes to be discontented; but so soon as you impart
your design to a discontented man, you supply him with the means of removing
his discontent, since by betraying you he can procure for himself every
advantage; so that seeing on the one hand certain gain, and on the other a
doubtful and dangerous risk, he must either be a rare friend to you, or the
mortal enemy of his Prince, if he keep your secret.
To put the matter shortly, I say that on the side of the conspirator
there are distrust, jealousy, and dread of punishment to deter him, while on
the side of the Prince there are the laws, the majesty of the throne, the
protection of friends and of the government to defend him; to which if the
general good-will of the people be added, it is hardly possible that any
should be rash enough to conspire. For while in ordinary cases, the
conspirator has ground for fear only before the execution of his villainy, in
this case he has also cause to fear after the crime has been perpetrated,
since he has the people for his enemy, and is thus cut off from every hope of
shelter.
Of this, endless instances might be given, but I shall content myself
with one that happened within the recollection of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivoglio, Lord of Bologna and grandfather of the present Messer
Annibale, was conspired against and murdered by the Canneschi, leaving behind
none belonging to him save Messer Giovanni, then an infant in arms.
Immediately upon the murder, the people rose and put all the Canneschi to
death. This resulted from the general goodwill with which the House of the
Bentivogli was then regarded in Bologna; which feeling was so strong, that
when upon the death of Messer Annibale no one was left who could govern the
State, there being reason to believe that a descendant of the family (who up
to that time had been thought to be the son of a smith), was living in
Florence, the citizens of Bologna came there for him, and entrusted him with
the government of their city; which he retained until Messer Giovanni was old
enough to govern.
To be brief, a Prince has little to fear from conspiracies when his
subjects are well disposed towards him; but when they are hostile and hold him
in detestation, he has then reason to fear everything and every one. And well
ordered States and wise Princes have provided with extreme care that the
nobility shall not be driven to desperation, and that the commons shall be
kept satisfied and contented; for this is one of the most important matters
that a Prince has to look to.
Among the well ordered and governed Kingdoms of our day is that of
France, wherein we find an infinite number of wise institutions, upon which
depend the freedom and the security of the King, and of which the most
important are the Parliament and its authority. For he who gave its
constitution to this Realm, knowing the ambition and arrogance of the nobles,
and judging it necessary to bridle and restrain them, and on the other hand
knowing the hatred, originating in fear, entertained against them by the
commons, and desiring that they should be safe, was unwilling that the
responsibility for this should rest on the King; and to relieve him of the
ill-will which he might incur with the nobles by favouring the commons, or
with the commons by favouring the nobles, appointed a third party to be
arbitrator, who without committing the King, might depress the nobles and
uphold the commons. Nor could there be any better, wiser, or surer safeguard
for the King and the Kingdom. And hence we may draw another notable lesson,
namely, that Princes should devolve on others those matters that entail
responsibility, and reserve to themselves those that relate to grace and
favour. And again I say that a Prince should esteem the great, but must not
make himself odious to the people.
To some it may perhaps appear, that if the lives and deaths of many
of the Roman Emperors be considered, they offer examples opposed to the views
expressed by me; since we find that some among them who had always lived good
lives, and shown themselves possessed of great qualities, were nevertheless
deposed and even put to death by their subjects who had conspired against
them.
In answer to such objections, I shall examine the characters of several
Emperors, and show that the causes of their downfall were in no way different
from those which I have indicated. In doing this I shall submit for
consideration such matters only as must strike every one who reads the history
of these times; and it will be enough for my purpose to take those Emperors
who reigned from the time of Marcus the Philosopher to the time of Maximinus,
who were, inclusively, Marcus, Commodus his son, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus,
Caracalla his son, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
In the first place, then, we have to note that while in other Princedoms
the Prince has only to contend with the ambition of the nobles and the
insubordination of the people, the Roman Emperors had a further difficulty to
encounter in the cruelty and rapacity of their soldiers, which were so
distracting as to cause the ruin of many of these Princes. For it was hardly
possible for them to satisfy both the soldiers and the people; the latter
loving peace and therefore preferring sober Princes, while the former
preferred a Prince of a warlike spirit, however harsh, haughty, or rapacious;
being willing that he should exercise these qualities against the people, as
the means of procuring for themselves double pay, and indulging their greed
and cruelty.
Whence it followed that those Emperors who had not inherited or won for
themselves such authority as enabled them to keep both people and soldiers in
check, were always ruined. The most of them, and those especially who came to
the Empire new and without experience, seeing the difficulty of dealing with
these conflicting humours, set themselves to satisfy the soldiers, and made
little account of offending the people. And for them this was a necessary
course to take; for as Princes cannot escape being hated by some, they should,
in the first place, endeavour not to be hated by a class; failing in which,
they must do all they can to escape the hatred of that class which is the
stronger. Wherefore those Emperors who, by reason of their newness, stood in
need of extraordinary support, sided with the soldiery rather than with the
people; a course which turned out advantageous or otherwise, according as the
Prince knew, or did not know, how to maintain his authority over them.
From the causes indicated it resulted that Marcus, Pertinax, and
Alexander, being Princes of a temperate disposition, lovers of justice,
enemies of cruelty, gentle, and kindly, had all, save Marcus, an unhappy end.
Marcus alone lived and died honoured in the highest degree; and this because
he had succeeded to the Empire by right of inheritance, and not through the
favour either of the soldiery or of the people; and also because, being
endowed with many virtues which made him revered, he kept, while he lived,
both factions within bounds, and was never either hated or despised.
But Pertinax was chosen Emperor against the will of the soldiery, who
being accustomed to a licentious life under Commodus, could not tolerate the
stricter discipline to which his successor sought to bring them back. And
having thus made himself hated, and being at the same time despised by reason
of his advanced age, he was ruined at the very outset of his reign.
And here it is to be noted that hatred is incurred as well on account of
good actions as of bad; for which reason, as I have already said, a Prince
who would maintain his authority is often compelled to be other than good. For
when the class, be it the people, the soldiers, or the nobles, on whom you
judge it necessary to rely for your support, is corrupt, you must needs adapt
yourself to its humours, and satisfy these, in which case virtuous conduct
will only prejudice you.
Let us now come to Alexander, who was so just a ruler that among the
praises ascribed to him it is recorded, that, during the fourteen years he
held the Empire, no man was ever put to death by him without trial.
Nevertheless, being accounted effeminate, and thought to be governed by his
mother, he fell into contempt, and the army conspiring against him, slew him.
When we turn to consider the characters of Commodus, Severus, and
Caracalla, we find them all to have been most cruel and rapacious Princes, who
to satisfy the soldiery, scrupled not to inflict every kind of wrong upon the
people. And all of them, except Severus, came to a bad end. But in Severus
there was such strength of character, that, keeping the soldiers his friends,
he was able, although he oppressed the people, to reign on prosperously to the
last; because his great qualities made him so admirable in the eyes both of
the people and the soldiers, that the former remained in a manner amazed and
awestruck, while the latter were respectful and contented.
And because his actions, for one who was a new Prince, were thus
remarkable, I will point out shortly how well he understood to play the part
both of the lion and of the fox, each of which natures, as I have observed
before, a Prince should know how to assume.
Knowing the indolent disposition of the Emperor Julianus, Severus
persuaded the army which he commanded in Illyria that it was their duty to go
to Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been slain by the Pretorian
guards. Under this pretext, and without disclosing his design on the Empire,
he put his army in march, and reached Italy before it was known that he had
set out. On his arrival in Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him Emperor
and put Julianus to death. After taking this first step, two obstacles still
remained to his becoming sole master of the Empire; one in Asia, where Niger
who commanded the armies of the East had caused himself to be proclaimed
Emperor; the other in the West, where Albinus, who also aspired to the
Empire, was in command. And as Severus judged it dangerous to declare open
war against both, he resolved to proceed against Niger by arms, and against
Albinus by artifice. To the latter, accordingly, he wrote, that having been
chosen Emperor by the Senate, he desired to share the dignity with him; that
he therefore sent him the title of Caesar, and in accordance with a
resolution of the Senate assumed him as his colleague. All which statements
Albinus accepted as true. But so soon as Severus had defeated and slain
Niger, and restored tranquillity in the East, returning to Rome he complained
in the Senate that Albinus, all unmindful of the favours he had received from
him, had treacherously sought to destroy him; for which cause he was
compelled to go and punish his ingratitude. Whereupon he set forth to seek
Albinus in Gaul, where he at once deprived him of his dignities and his life.
Whoever, therefore, examines carefully the actions of this Emperor, will
find in him all the fierceness of the lion and all the craft of the fox, and
will note how he was feared and respected by the people, yet not hated by the
army, and will not be surprised that though a new man, he was able to
maintain his hold of so great an Empire. For the splendour of his reputation
always shielded him from the odium which the people might otherwise have
conceived against him by reason of his cruelty and rapacity.
Caracalla, his son, was likewise a man of great parts, endowed with
qualities that made him admirable in the sight of the people, and endeared
him to the army, being of a warlike spirit, most patient of fatigue, and
contemning all luxury in food and every other effeminacy. Nevertheless, his
ferocity and cruelty were so extravagant and unheard of (he having put to
death a vast number of the inhabitants of Rome at different times, and the
whole of those of Alexandria at a stroke), that he came to be detested by all
the world, and so feared even by those whom he had about him, that at the
last he was slain by a centurion in the midst of his army.
And here let it be noted that deaths like this which are the result of a
deliberate and fixed resolve, cannot be escaped by Princes, since any one who
disregards his own life can effect them. A Prince, however, needs the less to
fear them as they are seldom attempted. The only precaution he can take is to
avoid doing grave wrong to any of those who serve him, or whom he has near
him as officers of his Court, a precaution which Caracalla neglected in
putting to a shameful death the brother of this centurion, and in using daily
threats against the man himself, whom he nevertheless retained as one of his
bodyguard. This, as the event showed, was a rash and fatal course.
We come next to Commodus, who, as he took the Empire by hereditary
right, ought to have held it with much ease. For being the son of Marcus, he
had only to follow in his father`s footsteps to content both the people and
the soldiery. But being of a cruel and brutal nature, to sate his rapacity at
the expense of the people, he sought support from the army, and indulged it
in every kind of excess. On the other hand, by an utter disregard of his
dignity, in frequently descending into the arena to fight with gladiators,
and by other base acts wholly unworthy of the Imperial station, he became
contemptible in the eyes of the soldiery; and being on the one hand hated, on
the other despised, was at last conspired against and murdered.
The character of Maximinus remains to be touched upon. He was of a very
warlike disposition, and on the death of Alexander, of whom we have already
spoken, was chosen Emperor by the army who had been displeased with the
effeminacy of that Prince. But this dignity he did not long enjoy, since two
causes concurred to render him at once odious and contemptible; the one the
baseness of his origin, he having at one time herded sheep in Thrace, a fact
well known to all, and which led all to look on him with disdain; the other
that on being proclaimed Emperor, delaying to repair to Rome and enter on
possession of the Imperial throne, he incurred the reputation of excessive
cruelty by reason of the many atrocities perpetrated by his prefects in Rome
and other parts of the Empire. The result was that the whole world, stirred
at once with scorn of his mean birth and with the hatred which the dread of
his ferocity inspired, combined against him, Africa leading the way, the
Senate and people of Rome and the whole of Italy following. In which
conspiracy his own army joined. For they, being engaged in the siege of
Aquileja and finding difficulty in reducing it, disgusted with his cruelty,
and less afraid of him when they saw so many against him, put him to death.
I need say nothing of Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julianus, all of whom
being utterly despicable, came to a speedy downfall, but shall conclude these
remarks by observing, that the Princes of our own days are less troubled with
the difficulty of having to make constant efforts to keep their soldier in
good humour. For though they must treat them with some indulgence, the need
for doing so is soon over, since none of these Princes possesses a standing
army which, like the armies of the Roman Empire, has strengthened with the
growth of his government and the administration of his State. And if it was
then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, because the
soldiers were more powerful than the people, now it is more necessary for all
Princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather than
the soldiery, since the former are more powerful than the latter.
I except the Turk because he has always about him some twelve thousand
foot soldiers and fifteen thousand horse, on whom depend the security and
strength of his kingdom, and with whom he must needs keep on good terms, all
regard for the people being subordinate. The government of the Soldan is
similar, so that he too being wholly in the hands of his soldiers, must keep
well with them without regard to the people.
And here you are to note that the State of the Soldan, while it is
unlike all other Princedoms, resembles the Christian Pontificate in this,
that it can neither be classed as new, nor as hereditary. For the sons of a
Soldan who dies do not succeed to the kingdom as his heirs, but he who is
elected to the post by those who have authority to make such elections. And
this being the ancient and established order of things, the Princedoms cannot
be accounted new, since none of the difficulties that attend new Princedoms
are found in it. For although the Prince be new, the institutions of the
State are old, and are so contrived that the elected Prince is accepted as
though he were an hereditary Sovereign.
But returning to the matter in hand, I say that whoever reflects on the
above reasoning will see that either hatred or contempt was the ruin of the
Emperors whom I have named; and will also understand how it happened that
some taking one way and some the opposite, one only by each of these roads
came to a happy, and all the rest to an unhappy end. Because for Pertinax and
Alexander, they being new Princes, it was useless and hurtful to try to
imitate Marcus, who was an hereditary Prince; and similarly for Caracalla,
Commodus, and Maximinus it was a fatal error to imitate Severus, since they
lacked the qualities that would have enabled them to tread in his footsteps.
In short, a Prince new to the Princedom cannot imitate the actions of
Marcus, nor is it necessary that he should imitate all those of Severus; but
he should borrow from Severus those parts of his conduct which are needed to
serve as a foundation for his government, and from Marcus those suited to
maintain it, and render it glorious when once established.
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