|
Chapter XIII.
Chapter XIII.
Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and National Arms
The second sort of unprofitable arms are auxiliaries, by whom I mean,
troops brought to help and protect you by a potentate whom you summon to your
aid; as when in recent times, Pope Julius II observing the pitiful
behaviour of his mercenaries at the enterprise of Ferrara, betook himself to
auxiliaries, and arranged with Ferdinand of Spain to be supplied with horse
and foot soldiers.
Auxiliaries may be excellent and useful soldiers for themselves, but are
always hurtful to him who calls them in; for if they are defeated, he is
undone, if victorious, he becomes their prisoner. Ancient histories abound
with instances of this, but I shall not pass from the example of Pope Julius,
which is still fresh in men`s minds. It was the height of rashness for him, in
his eagerness to gain Ferrara, to throw himself without reserve into the arms
of a stranger. Nevertheless, his good fortune came to his rescue, and he had
not to reap the fruits of his ill-considered conduct. For after his
auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, the Swiss suddenly descended and, to
their own surprise and that of every one else, swept the victors out of the
country, so that, he neither remained a prisoner with his enemies, they being
put to flight, nor with his auxiliaries, because victory was won by other arms
than theirs. The Florentines, being wholly without soldiers of their own,
brought ten thousand French men-at-arms to the siege of Pisa, thereby
incurring greater peril than at any previous time of trouble. To protect
himself from his neighbours, the Emperor of Constantinople summoned ten
thousand Turkish soldiers into Greece, who, when the war was over, refused to
leave, and this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the Infidel.
Let him, therefore, who would deprive himself of every chance of success,
have recourse to auxiliaries, these being far more dangerous than mercenary
arms, bringing ruin with them ready made. For they are united, and wholly
under the control of their own officers; whereas, before mercenaries, even
after gaining a victory, can do you hurt, longer time and better opportunities
are needed; because, as they are made up of separate companies, raised and
paid by you, he whom you place in command cannot at once acquire such
authority over them as will be injurious to you. In short, with mercenaries
your greatest danger is from their inertness and cowardice, with auxiliaries
from their valour. Wise Princes, therefore, have always eschewed these arms,
and trusted rather to their own, and have preferred defeat with the latter to
victory with the former, counting that as no true victory which is gained by
foreign aid.
I shall never hesitate to cite the example of Cesare Borgia and his
actions. He entered Romagna with a force of auxiliaries, all of them French
men-at-arms, with whom he took Imola and Forli. But it appearing to him
afterwards that these troops were not to be trusted, he had recourse to
mercenaries from whom he thought there would be less danger, and took the
Orsini and Vitelli into his pay. But finding these likewise while under his
command to be fickle, false, and treacherous, he got rid of them, and fell
back on troops of his own raising. And we may readily discern the difference
between these various kinds of arms, by observing the different degrees of
reputation in which the Duke stood while he depended upon the French alone,
when he took the Orsini and Vitelli into his pay, and when he fell back on his
own troops and his own resources; for we find his reputation always
increasing, and that he was never so well thought of as when every one
perceived him to be sole master of his own forces.
I am unwilling to leave these examples, drawn from what has taken place
in Italy and in recent times; and yet I must not omit to notice the case of
Hiero of Syracuse, who is one of those whom I have already named. He, as I
have before related, being made captain of their armies by the Syracusans, saw
at once that a force of mercenary soldiers, supplied by men resembling our
Italian condottieri, was not serviceable; and as he would not retain and
could not disband them, he caused them all to be cut to pieces, and afterwards
made war with native soldiers only, without other aid.
And here I would call to mind a passage in the Old Testament as bearing
on this point. When David offered himself to Saul to go forth and fight
Goliath the Philistine champion, Saul to encourage him armed him with his own
armour, which David, so soon as he had put it on, rejected, saying that with
these untried arms he could not prevail, and that he chose rather to meet his
enemy with only his sling and his sword. In a word, the armour of others is
too wide, or too strait for us; it falls off us, or it weighs us down.
Charles VII, the father of Louis XI, who by his good fortune and valour
freed France from the English, saw this necessity of strengthening himself
with a national army, and drew up ordinances regulating the service both of
men-at-arms and of foot soldiers throughout his kingdom. But afterwards his
son, King Louis, did away with the national infantry, and began to hire Swiss
mercenaries. Which blunder having been followed by subsequent Princes, has
been the cause, as the result shows, of the dangers into which the kingdom of
France has fallen; for, by enhancing the reputation of the Swiss, the whole of
the national troops of France have been deteriorated. For from their infantry
being done away with, their men-at-arms are made wholly dependent on foreign
assistance, and being accustomed to co-operate with the Swiss, have grown to
think they can do nothing without them. Hence the French are no match for the
Swiss, and without them cannot succeed against others.
The armies of France, then, are mixed, being partly national and partly
mercenary. Armies thus composed are far superior to mere mercenaries or mere
auxiliaries, but far inferior to forces purely national. And this example is
in itself conclusive, for the realm of France would be invincible if the
military ordinances of Charles VII had been retained and extended. But from
want of foresight men make changes which relishing well at first do not betray
their hidden venom, as I have already observed respecting hectic fever.
Nevertheless, the ruler is not truly wise who cannot discern evils before they
develop themselves, and this is a faculty given to few.
If we look for the causes which first led to the overthrow of the Roman
Empire, they will be found to have had their source in the employment of
Gothic mercenaries, for from that hour the strength of the Romans began to
wane and all the virtue which went from them passed to the Goths. And, to be
brief, I say that without national arms no Princedom is safe, but on the
contrary is wholly dependent on Fortune, being without the strength that could
defend it in adversity. And it has always been the deliberate opinion of the
wise, that nothing is so infirm and fleeting as a reputation for power not
founded upon a national army, by which I mean one composed of subjects,
citizens, and dependents, all others being mercenary or auxiliary.
The methods to be followed for organizing a national army may readily be
ascertained, if the rules above laid down by me, and by which I abide, be well
considered, and attention be given to the manner in which Philip, father of
Alexander the Great, and many other Princes and Republics have armed and
disposed their forces.
|
