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Chapter IX.
Chapter IX.
Of the Civil Princedom
I come now to the second case, namely, of the leading citizen who, not by
crimes or violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens is made Prince of
his country. This may be called a Civil Princedom, and its attainment depends
not wholly on merit, nor wholly on good fortune, but rather on what may be
termed a fortunate astuteness. I say then that the road to this Princedom lies
either through the favour of the people or of the nobles. For in every city
are to be found these two opposed humours having their origin in this, that
the people desire not to be domineered over or oppressed by the nobles, while
the nobles desire to oppress and domineer over the people. And from these two
contrary appetites there arises in cities one of three results, a Princedom,
or Liberty, or Licence. A Princedom is created either by the people or by the
nobles, according as one or other of these factions has occasion for it. For
when the nobles perceive that they cannot withstand the people, they set to
work to magnify the reputation of one of their number, and make him their
Prince, to the end that under his shadow they may be enabled to indulge their
desires. The people, on the other hand, when they see that they cannot make
head against the nobles, invest a single citizen with all their influence and
make him Prince, that they may have the shelter of his authority.
He who is made Prince by the favour of the nobles, has greater difficulty
to maintain himself than he who comes to the Princedom by aid of the people,
since he finds many about him who think themselves as good as he, and whom, on
that account, he cannot guide or govern as he would. But he who reaches the
Princedom by the popular support, finds himself alone, with none, or but a
very few about him who are not ready to obey. Moreover, the demands of the
nobles cannot be satisfied with credit to the Prince, nor without injury to
others, while those of the people well may, the aim of the people being more
honourable than that of the nobles, the latter seeking to oppress, the former
not to be oppressed. Add to this, that a Prince can never secure himself
against a disaffected people, their number being too great, while he may
against a disaffected nobility, since their number is small. The worst that a
Prince need fear from a disaffected people is, that they may desert him,
whereas when the nobles are his enemies he has to fear not only that they may
desert him, but also that they may turn against him; because, as they have
greater craft and foresight, they always choose their time to suit their
safety, and seek favour with the side they think will win. Again, a Prince
must always live with the same people, but need not always live with the same
nobles, being able to make and unmake these from day to day, and give and take
away their authority at his pleasure.
But to make this part of the matter clearer, I say that as regards the
nobles there is this first distinction to be made. They either so govern their
conduct as to bind themselves wholly to your fortunes, or they do not. Those
who so bind themselves, and who are not grasping, should be loved and
honoured. As to those who do not so bind themselves, there is this further
distinction. For the most part they are held back by pusillanimity and a
natural defect of courage, in which case you should make use of them, and of
those among them more especially who are prudent, for they will do you honour
in prosperity, and in adversity give you no cause for fear. But where they
abstain from attaching themselves to you of set purpose and for ambitious
ends, it is a sign that they are thinking more of themselves than of you, and
against such men a Prince should be on his guard, and treat them as though
they were declared enemies, for in his adversity they will always help to ruin
him.
He who becomes a Prince through the favour of the people should always
keep on good terms with them; which it is easy for him to do, since all they
ask is not to be oppressed. But he who against the will of the people is made
a Prince by the favour of the nobles, must, above all things, seek to
conciliate the people, which he readily may by taking them under his
protection. For since men who are well treated by one whom they expected to
treat them ill, feel the more beholden to their benefactor, the people will at
once become better disposed to such a Prince when he protects them, than if he
owed his Princedom to them.
There are many ways in which a Prince may gain the good-will of the
people, but, because these vary with circumstances, no certain rule can be
laid down respecting them, and I shall, therefore, say no more about them.
But this is the sum of the matter, that it is essential for a Prince to be on
a friendly footing with his people, since otherwise, he will have no resource
in adversity. Nabis, Prince of Sparta, was attacked by the whole hosts of
Greece, and by a Roman army flushed with victory, and defended his country and
crown against them; and when danger approached, there were but few of his
subjects against whom he needed to guard himself, whereas had the people been
hostile, this would not have been enough.
And what I affirm let no one controvert by citing the old saw that `he
who builds on the people builds on mire,` for that may be true of a private
citizen who presumes on his favour with the people, and counts on being
rescued by them when overpowered by his enemies or by the magistrates. In such
cases a man may often find himself deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in
Rome, and in Florence to Messer Giorgio Scali. But when he who builds on the
people is a Prince capable of command, of a spirit not to be cast down by
ill-fortune, who, while he animates the whole community by his courage and
bearing, neglects no prudent precaution, he will not find himself betrayed by
the people, but will be seen to have laid his foundations well.
The most critical juncture for Princedoms of this kind, is at the moment
when they are about to pass from the popular to the absolute form of
government: and as these Princes exercise their authority either directly or
through the agency of the magistrates, in the latter case their position is
weaker and more hazardous, since they are wholly in the power of those
citizens to whom the magistracies are entrusted, who can, and especially in
difficult times, with the greatest ease deprive them of their authority,
either by opposing, or by not obeying them. And in times of peril it is too
late for a Prince to assume to himself an absolute authority, for the citizens
and subjects who are accustomed to take their orders from the magistrates,
will not when dangers threaten take them from the Prince, so that at such
seasons there will always be very few in whom he can trust. Such Princes,
therefore, must not build on what they see in tranquil times when the citizens
feel the need of the State. For then every one is ready to run, to promise,
and, danger of death being remote, even to die for the State. But in troubled
times, when the State has need of its citizens, few of them are to be found.
And the risk of the experiment is the greater in that it can only be made
once. Wherefore, a wise Prince should devise means whereby his subjects may at
all times, whether favourable or adverse, feel the need of the State and of
him, and then they will always be faithful to him.
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